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This paper reports experimental evidence on a stylized labor market. The experiment is 
designed as a sequence of three treatments. In the last treatment, TR3, four principals, 
who face four teams of two agents, compete by offering the agents a contract from a 
fixed menu. In this menu, each contract is the optimal solution of a (complete 
information) mechanism design problem where principals face agents’ who have social 
(i.e. interdependent) distributional preferences a’ la Fehr and Schmidt [19] with a 
specific parametrization. Each agent selects one of the available contracts offered by the 
principals (i.e. he “chooses to work” for a principal). Production is determined by the 
outcome of a simple effort game induced by the chosen contract. In the first two 
treatments, TR1 and TR2, we estimate individual social preference parameters and 
beliefs in the effort game, respectively. We find that social preferences are significant 
determinants of the matching process between labor supply and demand in the market 
stage, as well as principals’ and agents’ contract and effort decisions. In addition, we 
also see that social preferences explain the matching process in the labor market, as 
agents display a higher propensity to choose to work for a principal with similar 
distributional preferences. 
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1 Introduction
Contract theory applied to personnel economics (both in its moral hazard
and adverse selection/screening versions) predicts that there should be a
substantial amount of inequality of pay within organizations. But the evi-
dence on this is rather disappointing. For example, Baker et al. [3] comment
that: “Evidence from research on compensation plans indicates that explicit
financial rewards in the form of transitory performance-based bonuses sel-
dom account for an important part of a workers compensation.” Screening
models also perform badly in this respect. Very few companies offer explicit
or implicit menus of contracts from which the workers can choose, one of
the more robust implications of this kind of models. The recent literature
on fairness in game theory and experimental economics (see e.g. the sur-
veys of Fehr-Schmidt [21] and Sobel [31]) has provided one way to explain
these facts. Namely, workers have interdependent (inequality-averse) distri-
butional preferences and dislike earning less than their peers. Thus, even a
self-interested manager should take this into account when constructing her
pay packages and may moderate the use of incentive pay and other forms of
unequal payoffs.
This explanation is an important advance, but it is incomplete, as it
cannot account, in its simplest form, for a couple of additional empirical
observations. First, even if within-firm wage inequality is rarely observed,
there is instead ample evidence of large inter-firm wage differentials (Card
and di Nardo [13]). Second, the same experimental evidence that showed
convincingly the existence of interdependent preferences, also showed clearly
that individuals widely differ in the way in which their preferences depended
on the outcomes of others. It turns out that the two phenomena can be
related. Cabrales and Calvo´-Armengol [12] show theoretically that if workers
care about the pay of others and if they work in close locations, then workers
of different abilities will sort into firms at different locations. By the same
token, one would expect workers with different distributional concerns would
also sort into different companies. One could, in fact, claim that this kind
of sorting is a concrete way to capture the concept of “corporate culture”
which, despite its importance in the management literature, has often eluded
economic theory.1
1Kreps [24] has made the case that corporate culture serves the purpose of aligning
expectations in organizations. See also Cre´mer [17] and Lazear [25] on other perspectives
of corporate culture as shared expectations or information.
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The aim of this paper is precisely to test experimentally the idea that
workers have heterogeneous distributional preferences, that these matter for
the contracts they are offered and choose, and for the way they sort into dif-
ferent firms. With this goal in mind, we design and perform an experiment on
a stylized labor market in which there are 4 principals and 4 pairs (”teams”)
of agents. Principals compete by offering a contract from a given set. A
contract specifies a pair of monetary rewards, one for each agent, if the team
is successful in the assigned project. Technology is such that agents can in-
crease the probability of success of the project by performing -independently
and simultaneously- a costly action. This probability only depends on the
number of agents who put effort, and not on their identity. This technology,
which we borrow from Winter [33], is interesting for two reasons related with
our motivating idea:
• First, individual effort is not contractible (in this sense, benefits are
only conditional on the success of the project, and not on each individ-
ual effort decision). This mirrors a feature of many real-life situations,
and also makes the inter-personal comparisons more focal for our ex-
perimental subjects.
• Second, in this environment, as Winter [33] shows, implementing the
high effort level as a unique equilibrium of the game (this is what we
call in the paper the sini solution) would require substantially unequal
payoffs among ex-ante identical agents. On the other hand, implement-
ing the high-effort level as one of two pure strategy equilibria (what
we call the wini solution), does not require inequality. However, in
this latter case, the high effort equilibrium is not robust to strategic
uncertainty.2
For the above reasons, this is an ideal environment to see the trade-offs
between robustness and fairness considerations: fairness can be obtained
only at the expense of robustness to strategic uncertainty. Heterogeneity
in preferences is a natural way to soften the impact of this dilemma. The
less inequality averse agents are quite willing to bear significant inequality in
order to avoid the cost of strategic uncertainty. Thus, if firms offer different
kinds of contracts (some more unequal but more robust, some less unequal
but more robust) workers can sort themselves into firms according to their
2Lopez-Pintado et al. [29] provide experimental evidence for Winter’s [33] model.
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preferences for inequality. Since differential contracts can match better indi-
viduals’ preferences, the firms can take advantage of the increased welfare to
become more attractive for workers (for any given wage bill).
The main finding our study is that this sorting of principals and agents by
their social preferences is indeed what happens in the lab: agents’ probability
of selecting a given contract is higher, the lower the distance (in the parameter
space) between their estimated preferences and those of the principals they
end up working for. Moreover, we also see that, not only the agents, but also
principals end up sorting themselves out into “corporate cultures” more in
tune with their personalities (i.e. their estimated distributional preferences).
Additionally, we observe that equality is a less important consideration than
robustness. The egalitarian (but not robust) wini contract is rarely selected
by both principals and agents.and, when it is selected, it often yields the low
effort outcome.
To explain how this happens, we need to describe in some more detail
the set of contracts from which the principal can choose. Given our setup,
the theoretical problem is complex. Since “social preferences” are unlikely
to be known, the principal would herself need to offer a menu of contracts to
each team. This menu would give agents incentives to perform, respecting
at the same time their (possibly heterogeneous) social preferences as much
as possible. Such complication seems to us both counterfactual, and too
hard to implement in the lab. Instead, we provide principals with a set of
available contracts to choose from. Each one of those contracts would be
optimal if it were common knowledge that the agents had preferences as
in Fehr and Schmidt [19] (F&S hereafter) with some particular parameter
values. We expect, and then corroborate in the data, that the presence of
several competing principals acts as a kind of menu of contracts between
which the agents sort themselves.
Before subjects face the experimental treatment we just described (TR3),
they had to play two introductory treatments in which we gradually get
them accustomed to the experimental conditions of the full-fledged model
while estimating, in sequence, individual social utility parameters and beliefs.
Precisely:
1. In the first treatment (TR1), subjects are randomly matched in pair and
play a sequence of Dictator Games in which they have to choose among
four options, each of which corresponds to a monetary payoff pair (one
for them, one for their teammate). The choice set, which changes at
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every round, corresponds to the (all-effort) equilibrium payoffs of the
games they will face later in the following two treatments. We use
TR1 to estimate subjects distributional preference parameters within
the realm of F&S’model.3
2. In the second treatment (TR2), subjects are, once again, randomly
matched in pair and, again, are asked to choose among four options
(within the same choice set and sequencing as in TR1). However, this
time, the choice of an option induces a simple 2x2 game-form which
they have then to play, at a subsequent stage. This corresponds to the
effort game induced by Winter’s [33] technology, given the ruling option
(i.e. contract). We use this treatment to estimate subjects’ beliefs in
the effort game as a function of subjects’ preferences (estimated in
TR1) and monetary payoffs in the game.
This three-stage experimental design (and the associated estimation strat-
egy) is novel, and it is especially designed to solve the identification problem
discussed by Manski [26], which is related to the impossibility to disentan-
gle preference and beliefs parameters when the experiment produces only
observations on game outcomes which, supposingly, are the results of the in-
teraction between subjects’ preferences and beliefs. As in TR1 (our Dictator
Game), beliefs do not play any role, we use data from TR1 to estimate indi-
vidual preference parameters, which we assume determine, together with the
beliefs, choices made in TR2. Under the assumption that preference parame-
ters are constant across treatments, data from TR2 convey useful information
to estimate subjects’ belief. This identification strategy exploits the possibil-
ity to create ad hoc treatments in the lab to solve the identification problems
and, if compared to what recently proposed by Bellemare et al. [5], it differs
because it does not rely upon hypothetical subjective probability questions
to estimate beliefs.
In this respect, our experiment yields the following conclusions. First,
subjects display a significant degree of heterogeneity in their decisions (which,
in turn, translates into heterogeneity in their estimated distributional pref-
erences and beliefs). This heterogeneity explains, to a large extent, agents’
behavior in TR3. That is, preferences and beliefs which best explain sub-
jects’ behavior in TR1 and TR2, typically also explain the contracts they
3When doing this exercise we allow for a larger set of interdependent preferences than
Fehr and Schmidt [19]. This will be clear when we describe the set of interdependent
preferences below.
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choose among those offered by the different principals in TR3, together with
their subsequent effort decision. More precisely, around 80% of total obser-
vations in TR3 are consistent with the estimated preferences and beliefs of
the concerned agents.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2, we set
up the theoretical model from which we derive the contract set. More pre-
cisely, we obtain the optimal wini and sini mechanisms in our environment
for all possible combinations of F&S social preference parameters. In design-
ing these contracts we solve a mechanism design problem that has interesting
(and novel) features in itself. In particular, we depart from the existing lit-
erature (take, e.g. Itoh [23] or Rey [27]) in two realistic directions. First, we
consider the moral hazard problem implicit in Winter’s [33] technology (who,
on the other hand, does not consider interdependent preferences). Second,
we remove the assumption that agents hold identical interdependent pref-
erences. In Section 3 we describe the experimental design and procedures,
while in Section 4 we develop an econometric model in which principals and
agents’ distributional preferences and beliefs are estimated in treatments TR1
and TR2 respectively. This information is finally used in TR3 to study the
full-fledged market behavior. Final remarks and guidelines for future re-
search are placed in Section 5, followed by an Appendix containing proofs
and experimental instructions.
2 The model
The economic environment we reproduced in the lab has the following fea-
tures. Within each round t,
1. At Stage 0, Nature moves first, fixing the choice set Ct =
{
bk
}
, k =
1, ..., 4,, where bk = (bk1, b
k
2) defines a contract. By construction, b
k
1 ≥ bk2,
∀k (i.e. 1 denotes the identity of the best paid agent, constant to
all contracts in Ct). Then, 4 principals (indexed as Player 0) choose,
simultaneously and independently, which contract they want to offer
for that round.
2. At Stage 1, 8 agents are randomly paired in 4 teams, with player
position (i.e. benefit ranking) determined randomly. Each agent has to
choose her favorite contract within the set C0t ⊆ Ct of contracts offered
by the principals. Once contracts have been chosen by the agents,
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another random draw selects who is the Dictator in the choice of the
contract, that is, the agent whose choice determines the ruling contract
b ∈ C0t for the pair.
3. At Stage 2 production takes place and payoffs are distributed, ac-
cording to a simple effort game-form G(b) induced by the contract b
selected by the Dictator. The rules of G(b) are as follows. Each agent
i has to decide, simultaneously and independently, whether to make a
costly effort. We denote by δi ∈ {0, 1} agent i ’s effort decision, where
δi = 1(0) if agent i does (not) put effort. Let also δ = (δ1, δ2) ∈ {0, 1}2
denote the action combination taken by the agents. The cost of effort is
c and is assumed to be constant across agents. Team activity results in
either success or failure. Let P (δ) define production as the probability
of success as a function of the number of agents in the team who have
put effort:
P (δ) =

0 if δ1 + δ2 = 0
γ if δ1 + δ2 = 1
1 if δ1 + δ2 = 2.
(1)
with γ ∈ (0, 1
2
).4
If the project fails, then all (principal and agents) receive a payoff of zero.
If the project succeeds, then agent i receives a benefit, bi > 0. We shall
further assume that both principal and agents are risk-neutral. Then, agent
i′s expected monetary profit is given by
pii (δ) = P (δ)bi − δic. (2)
The expected monetary payoff for the principal is determined by the
difference between expected revenues, for a given (randomly generated) value
for the project V ∼ U [A,B], and expected costs:
pi0(δ) = P (δ)(V − b1 − b2).
2.1 Agents’ (interdependent) preferences
We define the following preferences:
4This corresponding to an “increasing return technology”, according to Winter’s [33]
terminology.
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[F&S Preferences (FSP)] According to FSP, agents’ preferences are as
follows:
ui(δ) = pii(δ)− αimax(pij(δ)− pii(δ), 0)− βimax(pii(δ)− pij(δ), 0). (3)
In what follows, we shall focus on four parametrizations of (3), that we
shall employ to analyze the experimental evidence.
[Egoistic Preferences (EP)] According to EP, αi = βi = 0.
[Inequality Aversion Preferences (IAP)] According to IAPs,
0 ≥ αi ≥ βi (4)
0 ≤ βi < 1. (5)
Following Bazerman et al. [4], F&S impose to the model conditions (i)-(ii)
which can be rephrased as follows. By condition (i), αi (i.e. the parameter
that measures envy), cannot be lower than βi (i.e. the parameter that mea-
sures guilt). On the other hand, by condition (ii), guilt is bounded above by
1.
The literature has also focused upon two alternative parametrizations of
( 3), namely “status seeking” (SSP, see Frank [?]) and “efficiency-seeking”
(ESP, see Engelmann and Strobel [18]) preferences. By the former, an in-
crease in the other player’s monetary payoff is always disliked, independently
of relative positions, by the latter, a reduction in her own payoff is acceptable
only if it accompanied by an increase (at least of the same amount) in the
other player’s payoff.
[Status-Seeking Preferences (SSP)] According to SSP,
αi ∈ [0, 1), (6)
βi ∈ (−1, 0], (7)
|αi| ≥ |βi| . (8)
[Efficiency-Seeking Preferences (ESP)] According to ESP,
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αi ∈ (−1
2
, 0], (9)
βi ∈ [0, 1
2
), (10)
|βi| ≥ |αi| . (11)
Even though F&S only consider IAP preferences, we jointly call (with a
slight abuse of notation) F&S Preferences to the four types of preferences
described above (EP, IAP, SSP, ESP).
2.2 The mechanism design problem
We are now in the position to specify the mechanism design problem from
which we derive the contracts which are available to the principal. Assume a
principal who wishes to design a mechanism that induces all agents to exert
effort in (some) equilibrium of the game induced by G(b), which we denote
by Γ(b). A mechanism is an allocation of benefits in case of success, i.e., a
vector b that satisfies this property at the minimal cost for the principal.
In this respect, two alternatives routes are possible. Following Winter
[33], the principal may consider only mechanisms that strongly implement
the desired solution, in following sense:
[Strong INI mechanisms] We say that the mechanism b is strongly effort-
inducing (sini) if all Nash Equilibria (NE) of Γ(b) entail effort by all agents
with minimal benefit distribution.
If the principal is not particularly worried about the strategic uncertainty
induced by the presence of multiple equilibria (precisely, by the existence on
an equilibrium in which both agents do not make effort), he may opt for the
following (cheaper) alternative, satisfying the following
[Weak INI mechanisms] We say that the mechanism b is weakly effort-
inducing (wini) if there exists at least a NE of Γ(b) such that δ = (1, 1), with
minimal benefit distribution.
2.3 Solving Stage 2
Figure 1 describes the game-formG(b) agents face, once a given benefit profile
b = (b1, b2) is determined.
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0
1
0
0
γb2 − c
γb1
γb2
γb1 − c
b2 − c
b1 − c
Figure 1. The game-form G(b)
By analogy with our experimental conditions (and without loss of gen-
erality), we assume b1 ≥ b2. In Figure 2 we provide a graphic sketch of the
solutions of the two mechanism design problems, wini and sini, under the as-
sumptions that both agents share the same “preference type”, either IAP, or
SSP or ESP, although they may differ in their individual paramters (αs, βs),
provided they belong to the corresponding preference set. The (rather te-
dious) details of the 2× 3 = 6 proofs are reported in Appendix A.
Figure 2. Optimal contracts
The two big circles of Figure 2 correspond to the optimal contracts, wini
and sini, when both players hold EPs, whereas the small circles correspond
to the contracts actually used in the experiment. Notice that some points
lie outside the feasible regions defining the optimal contract space for each
preference type: this is because, in some periods, the optimal contracts were
derived in the case of subjects’ heterogenous preference types and, therefore,
their characterization was not covered by any of our propositions, and was
evaluated numerically (see Section Treatments below for further details).
As Figure 2 shows, wini and sini optimal contracts cover two disjoint
regions of the b1×b2 contract space: sini contracts differ from wini, essentially,
for the fact that player 1 is paid substantially more (while player 2 benefits
are more similar across mechanisms). This is because, as we shall explain
in Appendix A, in sini, player 1’s benefit needs to be high enough to make
the effort decision a weakly dominant strategy. We also notice that the “sini
cloud” is somehow more dispersed.
3 Experimental design
In what follows, we describe the features of the experiment in detail.
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3.1 Sessions
The experiment was conducted in 3 sessions in May, 2005. A total of 72
students (24 per session) were recruited among the student population of the
Universidad de Alicante -mainly, undergraduate students from the Economics
Department with no (or very little) prior exposure to game theory.
The 3 experimental sessions were computerized. Instructions were read
aloud and we let subjects ask about any doubt they may have had.5 In all
sessions, subjects were divided into two matching groups of 12, with subjects
from different matching groups never interacting with each other throughout
the session.6
3.2 Treatments
In each session, subjects played three treatments, TR1 to TR3, of increasing
complexity, for a total 72 rounds (24 rounds per treatment). This was done
to gradually introduce subjects to the strategic complexity of the market
environment and to estimate, in TR1 and TR2, subjects’ preferences and
beliefs, respectively.
In any given treatment, matching group and round, team composition
was randomly determined. Within each treatment and for each round t,
the choice set Ct =
{
bk
}
, k = 1, ...4, where bk ≡ (bk1, bk2), was drawn at
random, but not uniformly. Let us explain in more detail how this choice
was determined.
• Each contract bk in the set Ct is the optimal solution of one mechanism
design problem, either wini or sini, for some given randomly generated
preference profile
(
(αk1, β
k
1 ), (α
k
2, β
k
2 )
)
.
• Depending on the round t, the choice set Ct could be composed of
1. 4 wini contracts generated from 4 different preference profiles.
These rounds are labeled as wini in Figure 2.
5The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher
[22]). The complete set of instructions, translated into English, can be found in Appendix
B.
6Given this design feature, we shall read the data under the assumprion that the history
of each cohort (6 in total) corresponds to an independent observation of the corresponding
mechanism.
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2. 4 sini contracts generated from 4 different preference profiles These
rounds are labeled as sini in Figure 2.
3. 2 wini and 2 sini generated by two different preference profiles.
These rounds are labeled as mix in Figure 2.
• We will group rounds into time intervals. A time interval is defined
as a group of three consecutive rounds (starting at 1), and indexed by
p so that round τp = {3(p − 1) < t ≤ 3p}, is part of time interval
p = 1, ..., 8. Within each time interval τp, subjects experienced each
and every possible situation, 1. 2. or 3., and the sequence selected
within each time interval was generated randomly. We did so to keep
under control the time distance between two rounds characterized by
the same situation.
• Player position (either player 1 or player 2) was also chosen randomly,
for each team and round. This implies that, in the choice of contracts
agents faced in each round, the player position (either the higher paid
agent 1, or the lower paid agent 2) was common to all contracts.
• Finally, we also fixed in a deterministic fashion the sequence of prefer-
ence “types” (IAP, SSP and ESP) used to derive the optimal contracts.
The actual sequence of rounds, common to all matching groups and ses-
sions, is reported in Figure 3. In the figure, the rounds when only IAP
(respectively SSP, ESP) preferences are used for generating contracts
are labeled as IAP (respectively SSP, ESP). Also the periods when
two different types of preferences were used to generate contracts are
denoted by MIX in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Sequence of mechanisms
We now describe in detail the specific features of each treatment, TR1,
TR2 and TR3.
3.2.1 TR1 : Dictator Game (24 rounds)
We use the classic protocol of the Dictator Game, to collect our subjects
distributional preferences without any interference with any strategic con-
sideration. The timing for each round and cohort is as follows:
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1. At the beginning of the round, six pairs are formed at random. Within
each pair, another (independent and uniformly distributed) random
device determines player position.
2. Then, each agent, having been informed of her player position in the
pair (common to all contracts), selects her favorite contract within Ct,
the pool of 4 options available for that round.
3. Once choices are made, another independent draw fixes the identity
of the Dictator (for that couple and round). Let kˆ denote the ruling
contract (for that couple and round) corresponding to the Dictator’s
choice.
4. Monetary consequences are as follows pii = b
kˆ
i − c (i.e. subjects re-
ceive the corresponding equilibrium payoffs of the induced effort game
G(bkˆ)).
3.2.2 TR2 : Effort Game (24 rounds)
Phases 1 to 3 are identical to those of TR1. Instead of Phase 4, we have
4.1 Subjects play the effort game G(bkˆ).
4.2 Monetary payoff are distributed according to the payoff matrix of Fig-
ure 1.
3.2.3 TR3 : The Market (24 rounds)
This is the treatment described in the introduction. At the beginning of
TR3, within each matching group, 4 subjects are randomly chosen to play
as principals throughout the treatment. Then, in each round t, these 4
principals have to select one contract Ct to offer to the 4 teams in their
matching group. We denoted by C0t ⊆ Ct the set of contracts offered by at
least one principal (this set may be a singleton, since contracts offered by
the principals may all coincide, as it actually happened sometime during the
experiment).Agents have then to choose within this subset C0t . Phases 2-4.2
are then identical to TR2.
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3.3 Payoffs
In treatment TR2 and TR3 subjects always received, as monetary reward,
their expected payoff, given the strategy profile selected in the effort game
G(b). This was to make the experimental environment closer to the model’s
assumption of risk neutrality.
All monetary payoffs in the experiment were expressed in Spanish Pese-
tas (1 euro is approx. 166 ptas.).7 As for their financial rewards, subjects
received 1.000 ptas. just to show up. Monetary payoffs in the experiment
(in ptas.) were calculated by fixing c = 10 γ = 1
4
,A = 100 and B = 125
(i.e. V ∼ U [100, 125]). Average earnings were about 21 euros, for an approx-
imately 90-minute experiment.
3.4 Three (testable) questions from the theory
We are now in the position to specify the main objectives of our experiment:
Q1. Do the F&S preferences work? That is, does the model provide a re-
liable framework to predict principals and agents’ behavior? Evidence
for this in Remarks 4.3 and 4.3.
Q2. wini or sini? Remember that optimal contracts had been calculated by
using two different mechanism design strategies, which we denoted by
wini and sini, with rather different distributional consequences. Two
kinds of questions arise here.
Q2.1. Which contract type (wini or sini) induces more effort, and
which one is chosen more often by principals and agents? Evidence
for this in Remark 4.4.
Q2.2. What is the role of strategic uncertainty? That is, to which
extent does the (non) existence of multiple equilibria in wini (sini)
7It is standard practice, for all experiments run in Alicante, to use Spanish ptas. as
experimental currency. The reason for this design choice is twofold. First, it mitigates
integer problems, compared with other currencies (USD or Euros, for example). On the
other hand, although Spanish pesetas are no longer in use (substituted by the Euro in
the year 2000), Spanish people still use Pesetas to express monetary values in their every-
day life. In this respect, by using a ”real” (as a opposed to an artificial) currency, we
avoid the problem of framing the incentive structure of the experiment using a scale (e.g.
”Experimental Currency”) with no cognitive content.
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affect agents’ behavior in the effort game. Evidence for this in
Remark 4.4
Finally, our key question:
Q3. Does separation emerge? In other words, is the market able to sort
(principals and) agents according to their distributional preferences?
Evidence for this in Remark 4.5.
4 Results
In this Section, we shall first set up an econometric model by which we
directly estimate
1. F&S individual preference parameters using data from TR1
2. Agents’ beliefs in the effort game using data from TR2.
Once the experimental evidence is framed in the context of F&S’s model,
we will answer our testable questions.
4.1 TR1: estimating (individual) social preferences
As we already noted, in our Dictator Game (TR1), agents receive the (all
effort) equilibrium payoff corresponding to the plan chosen by the dictator.
In each round t, let Lst be a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if subject
s is the lower paid agent- and zero otherwise. Assuming that each subject s
is characterized by her own parameters αs and βs, her utility from choosing
contract k at round t can be written as
ukst = (1− Lst)
[
pik1t − βs
(
pik1t − pik2t
)]
+ Lst
[
pik2t − αs
(
pik1t − pik2t
)]
+ εkst
According to this notation, subject s chooses contract k at round t if
ukst = max
(
u1st, . . . , u
4
st
)
(remember that 4 contracts are available each round). Under the assumption
that the stochastic term εkst is iid with an extreme value distribution, the
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probability that individual s chooses the contract k at round t is therefore
Pr (ystk = 1|pi1(.), pi2(.))
=
exp
(
(1− Lst)
[
pik1t − βs
(
pik1t − pik2t
)]
+ Lst
[
pik2t − αs
(
pik1t − pik2t
)])∑4
k=1 exp
(
(1− Lst)
[
pik1t − βs
(
pik1t − pik2t
)]
+ Lst
[
pik2t − αs
(
pik1t − pik2t
)])(12)
Note that we allow for parameter heterogeneity across subjects. Thus, the
iid assumption does not stem from neglected individual unobserved hetero-
geneity, and it is consistent with the random order of the four contracts in
the choice set Ct. In Figure 4 we plot the estimated αs and βs of our subject
pool.
Fig. 4. Estimating individual social preferences
Figure 4 plots the estimated social preferences for our subject pool. Figure
4 is composed of two different graphs:
1. In Figure 4a) each subject corresponds to a point in the (α, β) space,
where we highlight the regions corresponding to the taxonomy pre-
sented in Section 2.1. As Figure 4 a) makes clear, our subjects display
significant heterogeneity in their distributional preferences. Moreiver,
in many cases, the constraints on absolute values (in particular, in the
case of IAP) are violated. This is the reson why, in what follows, we
shall refer to the corresponding quadrant in Figure 4a) to identify each
distributional preference type. In this respect, the majority of subjects
falls in the first quadrant (i.e. in the IAP case), followed by SSP and
ESP. Finally 10% of our subject pool displays both α and β negative
(a case not covered by the theoretical literature on these matters).
2. Figure 4b) reports, together with each estimated (α, β) pair (as in
Figure 4a), the corresponding 90% confidence intervals associated to
each individual estimated parameter. As Figure 4b) shows, we have
now many subjects whose estimated distributional preferences fall, with
nonnegligible probability, in more than one region. Moreover, for some
of them (about 20% of our subject pool), we cannot reject (at the 10%
confidence level) the null hypothesis of egoistic preferences.
We have two alternatives ways to summarize our results on subjects’
preference heterogeneity.
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A. First, we can partition our subject pool, assigning each subject to the
quadrant (Q1 to Q4) in which their estimated parameters are most
likely to fall. At the same time, we group in an additional “EP” cate-
gory those subjects s whose estimated αs and βs are jointly not signifi-
cantly different from zero (at the 10% confidence level). Following this
approach, Figure 5a) assigns each experimental subject (principals and
agents) to the corresponding “distributional preference type”.
Fig. 5. Partitioning principals and agents into distributional “types”
As for many subjects falling in quadrant Q1 (i.e. the IAP region) in
Figure 4, the estimated α and β are in fact not significantly different
than zero, the biggest group in Figure 5a) is that of Q4 (i.e ESP: 29.17%
of the total), followed by Q2 (SSP: 22.22%).
B. Alternatively, we can compute the probability that a randomly drawn
subject in the pool is characterized by a pair (αs, βs) belonging to one of
the four quadrants. This is the purpose of Figure 5b), in which these
probabilities are calculated by averaging out the corresponding indi-
vidual probabilities of the entire subject pool (disaggregated between
principals and agents). Notice that, EPs do not appear in Figure 5b)
since, by definition, egoistic preferences have zero mass in our prefer-
ence space. As a consequence, in Figure 5b), IAP (Q1) turns out to be
the most represented group (36% of total probability mass), followed
by ESP (Q4) and SSP (Q2), with almost the same representation (26%
and 24% respectively).
Finally, we can compare these results with those we obtain by estimating
distributional preferences of a “representative subject”, i.e. by estimating
the distributional preferences of our pool under the constraint that αs and
βs are constant across s. In this case, estimated parameters of α and β would
be .104 and .436 respectively (with standard deviations equal to 0.018 and
0.065).
The “representative agent” displays IAP distributional preferences in
which guilt predominates over envy, a case not usually considered by the
theoretical literature on social preferences.
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4.2 TR2: Estimating beliefs
In this Section, we look at agents’ effort decisions in TR2 as the result of a
process of expected utility maximization. Assuming that distributional pref-
erences are constant across treatments (i.e. that we can use each subject’s
(αs, βs) pair to parameterize her F&S utility function), the effort decision
(partially) reveals each individual’s subjective belief over the teammate’s ef-
fort decision. We condition these beliefs on player position, monetary payoffs
and estimated preferences, obtaining (by pseudo maximum likelihood) sub-
jective beliefs as a polynomial functions of α and β.
With this aim in mind, we set up the maximization problem facing each
player at the time of selecting her effort decision. For notational convenience,
in what follows we drop the round index (t) . For each plan k, the utility
function of the subject s in player position i is
uksi (δ) = pi
k
i (δ)−αsmax
(
pikj (δ)− piki (δ) , 0
)−βsmax (piki (δ)− pikj (δ) , 0)+εksi
where δ = (δ1, δ2), δi equals 1 if player i makes the effort, 0 otherwise. Given
the plan k chosen by the dictator in the first round of TR2
δki = 1
(
uksi
((
1, λkis
))
> uksi
((
0, λkis
)))
where λkis is subject s expectation on her teammate effort choice in plan
k. We parametrize λkis as a logistic function of the subject characteristics
(αs, βs), her player position and of the plan characteristics
(
bk1t, b
k
2t
)
λkis =
exp
(
ψi1b
k
i + ψi2(b
k
i − bkj ) + ψi3αs + ψi4βs
)
1 + exp
(
ψi1bki + ψi2(b
k
i − bkj ) + ψi3αs + ψi4βs
)
and assume that εksi is such that
Pr
(
δkis = 1|αs, βs, i,
(
bk1, b
k
2
))
=
exp
(
Eλkis
(
ukis (1)
))
exp
(
Eλkis
(
ukis (1)
))
+ exp
(
Eλkis
(
ukis (0)
)) (13)
We estimate the parameters of interest ψi = (ψi1, ψi2, ψi3, ψi4), i = 1, 2
by maximizing the pseudo-log-likelihood function. In fact, we do not ob-
serve (αs, βs), but we do have a consistent estimate of it
(
α̂s, β̂s
)
for all
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the subjects. Therefore the standard PML estimate of the covariance ma-
trix V ar
(
ψ̂i
)
is not consistent. To solve the problem we use TR1 to obtain
N = 400 bootstrap estimates of (αs, βs) for each of the 72 subjects and use
them to obtain the boostrap distribution of ψ̂i at the second stage TR2. Fig-
ure 6 reports the estimated values of ψ̂i, their bootstrap standard error and
the bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals.8
Player 1
Coeff. Std.err. 95% C.I.
ψ1 .02499448 .00309576 .0214083 .0384497
ψ2 -.0179758 00742303 -.0315004 -.0105376
ψ3 (α) .5542855 .25811632 .4046881 .9084173
ψ4 (β) -1.1180877 .33475749 -1.987688 -1.021415
Player 2
Coeff. Std.err. 95% C.I.
ψ1 .055668 .03092808 .0219957 .0867382
ψ2 .1185161 .11056904 -.0228495 .3816541
ψ3 (α) .817708 2.8946111 -1.226787 5.478475
ψ4 (β) -4.760476 2.4623682 -16.81285 -2.35411
Figure 6. Estimating subjective beliefs
Notice that, for both player positions estimated ψ1 is positive and sig-
nificant. That is, the higher is their own bi the more the individuals expect
their teammates to make effort. On the other hand estimated ψ4 (β) are
both negative: subjects with higher β are more pessimistic with respect to
their teammates willingness to cooperate. When subjects play as Player 1,
they worry about monetary payoff differences, and they expect their (un-
lucky) teammates to reduce their effort when the gap increase. Finally, more
envious (higher α) Players 1 expect their teammates to cooperate.
4.3 Q1. Does F&S work?
Before we check on how subjects’ decisions in TR3 are consistent with their
estimated preferences and beliefs, let us remind that the model of Section
8Due to convergency problem at the second stage of the bootstrap procedure, N=382
for the case of Player 2.
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2 only provides a suitable framework to predict agents’ decisions. This is
because, as we already discussed, to fully describe principals’ decision prob-
lem, one should consider a) competition among principals and b) incomplete
information about agents’ (and other competing principals) preferences.
On the other hand, once we provide agents with beliefs about their team-
mate’s action in the effort game, we can fully characterize the agents’ decision
problem. As a consequence, we provide a unique prediction about the agents’
modal choice.9 In this respect, Figure 7 reports the relative frequencies with
which agents acted so as to maximize their expected utility, subject to their
estimated preference parameters (αs, βs) and their subjective beliefs evalu-
ated by ( 12) and (13) respectively.
Fig. 7. Relative frequencies of agents’ consistent decisions in TR3
In Figure 7, the relative frequencies of consistent decisions are calculated
as follows:
1. We begin by evaluating, for each round and subject, her optimal effort
decision (conditional on her individual estimated parameters αs and
βs, her current player position i, and estimated subjective beliefs), for
all the contracts offered by the principals;
2. We then compare, in Figure 7a), agents’ actual decisions in TR3 with
their theoretical best-replies, highlighting in grey the relative frequency
of effort decisions which correspond to the best-reply of the effort game
selected by the Dictator;
3. The expected payoff of the optimal effort decision corresponds to the
value associated to each available contract. In Figure 7b) we again
compare actual and optimal contract choices, highlighting in grey the
relative frequency of contract choices which maximize each subject’s
value.
Estimated preferences and beliefs explain about 80% of observed agents’
choices.
9Remember that we work under the maintained assumption of a random utility frame-
work. Thus, in principle, all actions are consistent with the model, albeit with different
probabilities.
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As Figure 7a) shows, for both player positions, the relative frequency of
“optimal” effort decisions always exceeds 3/4 of total observations. As for
non-optimal effort choices, player 1 is more likely not to put effort when it
should do it otherwise, exactly the reverse than what happens with player
2. As for the contract choice, again, optimal decisions correspond, for both
player positions, to more than 4/5 of total observations.
To summarize, in analyzing our TR3 market dynamics, we find that a)
subjects’ distributional preferences provide a consistent framework to explain
the (heterogeneous) composition of the contract supply, as well as b) contract
demand and effort decisions.
As for principals’ decisions, as we already know, a direct prediction is not
available. The exercise here will then be to see how principals’ estimated
beliefs and preferences explain their contract decision, with respect to the
two dimensions which are more natural for the problem at stake. That is, a)
the total cost of the contract (b1+b2) and, b) its induced inequality (b1−b2).
As we know from Section 3, agents and principals were facing, in all
treatments, the same sequence of choice sets along the 24 rounds, randomly
selected following the balanced design of Figure 2. In this respect, we define,
for each choice set Ct (i.e. for any round t), the following two variables:
σ =
(
bk¯1 − bk¯2
)
−mink
(
bk1 − bk2
)
maxk
(
bk1 − bk2
)−mink (bk1 − bk2) , k = 1, ..., 4; (14)
τ =
(
bk¯1 + b
k¯
2
)
−mink[bk1 + bk2]
maxk[bk1 + b
k
2]−mink[bk1 + bk2]
, k = 1, ..., 4,
where k¯ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} denotes the contract selected by the principal in
round t. By (14), we normalize players’ benefits and costs, together with the
induced inequality each contract implies, with respect to the choice set Ct.
In other words, by choosing a contract for which τ = 1, a principal goes for
the option that, within the choice set available for that round, maximizes the
total contract cost. By the same token, by selecting the contract by which
σ = 0, (horizontal) inequality is minimized.
Figure 8 reports the estimates of four different (tobit) regressions, which
share the same structure:
yst = ϑ0 + ϑ1αs + ϑ2βs + ϑ3Vst + ϑ3xst + ϑt + εs + vst. (15)
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The four regressions differ with respect to the dependent variable yst un-
der consideration. In regression I the dependent variable is τst, that is the
variable we defined in (14) to measure the total contract cost relative to
the available alternatives in Ct. In regression II, the dependent variable is
instead θst =
1+σst
1+τst
, a proxy of the trade off principals face between the (hor-
izontal) induced inequality and total contract costs. Equations Ia and IIa
use, as dependent variables, E(τst |µ) and E(1+E(σst)1+E(τst) |µ) respectively, that is
the corresponding values of τ0st and θ0st conditional on the principals’ be-
liefs ( 13 ). In the four regressions, the corresponding dependent variable
y0st is assumed to be a linear function of the subject’s preference parameters
(αs, βs) and the (randomly generated) value for the principal Vst. A set of
round specific dummy variables xst are used to control for the heterogeneity
of the choice sets across rounds, as well as to control for matching group
and for mechanism and preference profile for the choice set Ct, as derived
from Figure 2. An individual time invariant (random) effect takes into ac-
count the unobserved individual heterogeneity. Assuming normality of the
random components εs and vst of equation (15) and strict exogeneity of the
covariates, the parameters of interest can be estimated using a MLE for a
double-censored tobit model for panel data. θ0 is in fact bounded between 0
and 1 (regressions I and Ia) or 1/2 and 2 (regressions II and IIa). In Figure
8 we report the estimated values for ϑ1 to ϑ3.
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Fig. 8. Social preferences and contract choices (Principals)
Beliefs and preferences parameters estimated in TR1 and TR2 account
well for the Principals’ observed choices.
As Figure 8 shows, principals characterized by higher αs and βs (i.e.
higher distributional concerns) tend to choose more expensive contracts, as
the corresponding coefficients in regressions I and Ia are always positive and
significant. The same conclusion holds both if we look at contracts face val-
ues (Regression I), or if we consider expected total costs, given our estimated
system of subjective beliefs (Regression Ia). Analogous considerations hold
when we consider the trade-off between induced inequality and total con-
tract costs (Regressions II and IIa): the higher αs and βs, the lower relative
inequality, as the corresponding coefficients are always negative (and signifi-
cant, with the exception of βs in equation IIa). In other words, our estimates
10The estimated coefficients for ϑ0, ϑ4 and ϑt are omitted in Figure 15, but available
upon request.
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suggest that principals’ choices vary with the parameters of the F&S utility
function: the more the principal is sensitive to envy and guilt, the more egal-
itarian (both with respect to “horizontal” as well as “vertical” inequality)
is the contract offered to the workers. On the other hand, conditional on
the characteristics of the choice set and on the preference parameters, the
project value Vst does not seem to play a relevant role.
4.4 Q2. wini or sini?
We now move into the mechanism design issue, analyzing subjects’ revealed
preferences over the type of contract, wini or sini. As we just explained
in Section 3, in 8 out of 24 rounds t, evenly distributed across the time-
line, agents and principals had to choose between two optimal wini and two
optimal sini contracts, built upon the same pair of preference parameters.
Figure 9 uses the information drawn from this subsample of observations to
discuss more in detail the choice of mechanism, tracing the relative frequency
of subjects’ choosing a sini contract in the 8 rounds in which both types of
contracts were available.
Fig. 9. Choice between wini and sini in the “mix” rounds
sini is the most frequent choice for all players and treatments.
In Figure 9, relative frequencies of choices are disaggregated for player
position and “preference type” as in fig. 5a). As Figure 9 shows, in all
treatments, sini is, by far, the most popular choice, and this is particularly
true for Player 1. As for principals, they also display a higher preference
for sini, even though choice frequencies are much closer to those of the least
advantaged Players 2.
We now move to analyze the agents’ effort decisions in TR2 and TR3 .
Figure 10 reports the relative frequency of effort choices disaggregated, once
again, for player position and preference type.
Fig. 10. Relative frequencies of effort decisions
Not surprisingly, player 1 has a higher tendency to put effort, indepen-
dently of her player type. This difference is much higher in sini (where her
benefit in case of success is substantially higher): it is double the one in wini
( 38% vs. 19%). Difference in effort across player position is particularly
strong in the case of Q2 (SSP) subjects in TR2 (while in TR3 it converges to
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a value which is comparable to the other preference types). Apart from the
case of SSP, effort frequencies of each preference group are basically constant
across treatments.
We now look at the extent to which individual effort decisions affect
aggregate outcomes (i.e. effort profiles). In Figure 11, we highlight in grey the
strategy profiles which correspond to a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding
mechanism.
Fig. 11. Outcome dynamics in the effort game
Effort is much higher in sini that in wini.
As Figure 11 shows, relative frequencies of the efficient (all-effort) equi-
librium are about twice larger in sini than in wini. In wini, the inefficient
(no-effort) equilibrium pools more than 1/3 of total observations (and it is,
for both TR2 and TR3, played more frequently than the efficient equilib-
rium). Also notice that about 30% of total observations correspond to a
(non-equilibrium) strategy profile in which only one agent puts effort. While
this frequency stays basically constant over treatments and mechanisms, it
is quite remarkable that the identity of the working agent crucially depends
on the mechanism being played (either wini or sini): in sini the relative fre-
quency of outcomes in which Agent 2 puts effort never exceeds 3% while, in
wini, this frequency is five times bigger. This is probably due to the strategic
uncertainty created by the existence of multiple equilibria in wini (strategic
uncertainty which affects both agents).
To summarize, sini induces a relative frequency of equilibrium outcomes
which is twice as much as in wini. In this respect, if we look at the mechanism
design problem from the principal’s viewpoint, our evidence yields a clear
preference for the “sini program”: despite its being more expensive (since
the sum of benefits to be distributed is higher), the difference in average
team effort is sufficient to compensate the difference in cost. In addition, in
the “mixed” rounds of TR3, principals offering sini contracts were selected
by agents with a much higher frequency. As a consequence, average profits
for a principal when offering a sini contract in the “mixed” rounds was
substantially higher, three times as much as the corresponding profits when
offering a wini contract (95.4 ptas. vs. 30.1).
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4.5 Q3. Does separation emerge?
We finally look at the separation issue. To this aim, we measure the correla-
tion between the (euclidean) distance -in the (αs, βs) space− between agents’
and principals estimated preferences (within the same matching group) and
the the number of times agents accepted the contract offered by the prin-
cipals. As it turns out, the correlation is negative (-.3967) and significant
at any conceivable confidence level. Things do not change if we normalize
distances in the [0,1] interval, 0 (1) being the smallest (largest) difference
between any agent and any principal belonging to the same matching group.
This normalization controls for the fact that the distance between the pools
of agents and principals can substantially differ across matching groups. In
this case, the estimated correlation coefficient is smaller (-.2694), but it still
remains highly significant (p = .0002). If we further disaggregate the analy-
sis, by normalizing the distance between each agent and the 4 principals of
her matching group, the result, again, does not change in its essence: the es-
timated correlation coefficient is -.248, with p = .0005. This evidence justifies
the following final
Agents are more likely to choose a contract offered by a principal with
more similar distributional preferences to her own.
5 Conclusion
Our experimental results are encouraging for our research program for, at
least, two reasons. First, because it provides evidence on the fact that dis-
tributional preferences may be at the core of how market sorts different atti-
tudes towards distributional issues into different organizational cultures. The
model is certainly ad-hoc in many respects (take, for example, our decision to
give to only one agent the monopolistic power to decide the ruling contract
for the entire team). Nevertheless, our experimental results are encouraging,
on the ground that such a parsimonious model of individual decision mak-
ing is capable of organizing consistently the evidence from such a complex
experimental environment.
In this respect F&S’s model seems to pass our “empirical examination”.
Given that principals face a more complex strategic environment, since they
compete with other principals to attract agents, the stability of social pref-
erences (and beliefs) across quite different environments is a positive piece
26
of news for the research program in interdependent preferences. It is true
that the literature has already discussed the ability of different models to
explain quite diverse data sets (see e.g. Fehr and Schmidt [21]). But, to
the best of our knowledge, this discussion has been done by showing that
the same distribution of parameters that explains behavior in experiment A,
also explains behavior in experiment B with a different subject pool. While
this is suggestive, it does not go far enough. Since individuals in experi-
ments A and B are different, it is possible that a subject that appeared to be
highly fair-minded in experiment A, would have given the opposite appear-
ance had she participated in experiment B. This kind of observation, by the
way, would not necessarily mean that the subjects preferences shifted from
one experiment to the other. It would also be consistent with having esti-
mated a misspecified model for preferences. Our experiments provide a more
definitive test, by following subjects’ choices (with particular reference to
principals’ decisions), and showing their consistency with F&S’ preferences,
across rather different tasks.
We conclude by discussing three possible avenues for future research.
From a theoretical standpoint, it would be interesting to solve completely
the mechanism design problem under incomplete information about the social
preferences of the agent. The menus of contracts available to agents, possibly
through the market via firms with different “corporate cultures” as in our
experiment, could have a theoretically interesting structure.
From an empirical point of view, it would be interesting to observe the
effect of having agents of different productivities, which are also private in-
formation. In this way we could see how finely and in which ways “corporate
culture” partitions the agents. Also, notice that, in our setup, the numbers of
principals and agents exactly balance one another. Thus, the effect of more
intense competition on the side of either principals or agents is an empirically
interesting extension.
Finally, we also would like to check the extent to which agents’ deci-
sions (and, consequently, the estimated distributional preferences which de-
rive from these decisions) depend on whether the choice of the optimal con-
tract is made before or after agents’ are told about their player position in
the game. If agents choose the contract before knowing their relative position
within the team (i.e. “under the veil of ignorance”), their decisions may also
reflect individuals’ attitude to risk, as well as distributional considerations.
This exercise would require to collect additional information about our ex-
perimental subjects on these two complementary dimensions, measuring how
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these dimensions interact in the solution of the decision problem facing them
in the experiment.
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Appendix A
6 Solution of the mechanism design problem
under the wini program
In the case of wini, the search of the optimal mechanism corresponds to the
following linear program:
b∗ ≡ (b∗1, b∗2) ∈ arg min{b1,b2}[b1 + b2] sub (16)
u1(1, 1) ≥ u1(0, 1) (17)
u2(1, 1) ≥ u2(1, 0) (18)
b1 ≥ b2 ≥ 0 (19)
Assumption (19) is wlog. To solve the problem (16-19 ), we begin by
partitioning the benefit space B =
{
(b1, b2) ∈ <2+, b1 ≥ b2
}
in two regions,
which specify the payoff ranking of each strategy profiles in G(b). This parti-
tion is relevant for our problem, since it determines whether in (1,0) - player
1 exerts effort and player 2 does not - whether it is player 1 or 2 the one who
experiences envy (guilt):
R1 =
{
b ∈ B : b2 ≤ b1 − c
γ
}
;
R2 =
{
b ∈ B : b1 − c
γ
≤ b2 ≤ b1
}
.
Let g1(b1) = b1
(
g2(b1) = b1 − cγ
)
define the two linear constraints upon
which our partition is built. The strategy proof is as follows. We shall solve
the linear program (16-19) in the two regions independently (since, within
each region, social utility parameters are constant for each agent and strategy
profile), checking which of the two solutions minimizies the averall benefit
sum b1+ b2, and determining the constraints on preferences which determine
the identity of the best-paid player 1.
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6.1 Wini under EPs
As for the solution of wini under EPs (i.e. with α1 = α2 = β1 = β2 = 0), the
linear program (16-19) simplifies to the following:
min b1 + b2
subject to:
b1 − c ≥ γb1
b2 − c ≥ γb2
bi ≥ 0; with i = 1, 2
In this case, the solution of the problem is problem is trivial:
b∗1 = b
∗
2 =
c
1−γ .
6.2 Wini under IAPs
As for the solution of wini under IAPs, we need to add to the basic linear
program (16-19) the IAPs constraints (4-5).
[winiIAP] The optimal wini mechanism under IAPs is as follows:
b∗1 =
(
c(−1+α2(−1+β1)+2β1+γ(−1+2β1)(−1+β2)−β1β2
(−1+γ)(1+α2−β1+γ(−1+β1+β2) ,
c(−1+β1)(−1+α2−β2+γ(−1+2β2))
(−1+γ)(1+α2−β1+γ(−1+β1+β2)
)
if β1 <
1
2
; (20)
b∗2 =
(
c(1− β1)
1− γ ,
c(1− β1)
1− γ
)
if β1 ≥ 1
2
, (21)
with β1 ≤ β2.
To prove Proposition 6.2, some preliminary lemmas are required. Let
bˆk ≡ (bˆk1, bˆk2) define the solution of the linear program (16-19) in Rk.
bˆ1 =
(
c(1 + α2)
(1− γ)γ ,
c(γ + α2)
(1− γ)γ
)
(22)
.
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Proof. In R1, agent 1’s monetary payoff, as determined by G(b), is always
higher (i.e. pi1(δ) ≥ pi2(δ), ∀δ). This, in turn, implies that constraints (17-18)
correspond to
b1 ≥ f 11 (b1) ≡
c(1− β1)
(1− γ)β1 −
1− β1
β1
b1; (23)
b2 ≥ f 12 (b1) ≡
c
1− γ +
α2
1 + α2
b1. (24)
Let xki define the value of b1 such that f
k
i (b1) = 0. By the same token,
let yki denote the intercept of f
k
i (b1), i.e. f
k
i (0). Finally, let τ
k
i denote the
slope of fki (b1). We then have x
1
1 =
c
1−γ and x
1
2 = − c(1+α2)(1−γ)α2 . Also notice that
0 ≤ τ 12 = α21+α2 < 1 and y12 = c1−γ > 0. This implies that f 12 (b1) and g2(b1)
intersect in the first quadrant of the b1× b2 space. On the other hand, f 11 (b1)
is never binding in this case, since τ 11 = −1−β1β1 < 0 and x11 = c1−γ < cγ
since γ < 1
2
. This implies that b1 + b2 is minimized where f
1
2 (b1) and g
2(b1)
intersect, i.e. when bˆ11 =
c(1+α2)
(1−γ)γ and bˆ
1
2 =
c(γ+α2)
(1−γ)γ .
In R2, the optimal wini contract under IAPs is (20) when β1 <
1
2
, and
(21) when β1 ≥ 12 , with β1 < β2.
Proof. In the case of R2, constraints (17-18) correspond to
b1 ≥ f 21 (b1) ≡
c(1− β1)
(1− γ)β1 −
1− β1
β1
b1; (25)
b2 ≥ f 22 (b1) ≡
c(1− β2)
1 + α2 − γ(1− β2) +
α2 + γβ2
1 + α2 − γ(1− β2)b1. (26)
This implies that f 11 (b1) = f
2
1 (b1) (i.e. the Nash equilibrium condition for
player 1 remains unchanged in both R1 and R2), τ
2
1 = −1−β1β1 < 0 (i.e.
|τ 21 | > 1 if β1 < 12), and 0 ≤ τ 22 = α2+γβ21+α2−γ(1−β2) < 1.
We first show that β1 ≤ β2. Let βˇ = min {β1, β2}. If β1 > β2, then the
optimal solution in R2 would be bˆ
1
i = bˆ
2
i =
c(1−βˇ)
1−γ (i.e. bˆ
1
i + bˆ
2
i = 2
c(1−βˇ)
1−γ ).
On the other hand, if β1 ≤ β2, then bˆ1i + bˆ2i ≤ 2 c(1−βˇ)1−γ . More precisely, if
β1 <
1
2
, the optimal solution is (20), that is, the intersection between f 21 (b1)
and f 22 (b1); if β1 ≥ 12 , the solution is (21), that is, the intersection between
f 21 (b1) and g
1(b1).
We are in the position to prove Proposition 6.2.
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Proof. [Proof of Proposition 1]. To prove the proposition, it is sufficient to
show that bˆ1i > bˆ
2
i , i = 1, 2. To see this, remember that f
1
1 (b1) = f
2
1 (b1). Also
remember that fk1 (b1) is (not) binding for both k = 1 and k = 2. If x
kl
i solves
fk1 (x) = g
l(x), then x122 = x
22
2 =
c(1+α2)
γ(1−γ) , which, in turn, implies
bˆ11 =
c(1 + α2)
γ(1− γ) > x
21
1 =
c(1− β1)
1− γ ≥ bˆ
2
1 and
bˆ12 =
c(γ + α2)
γ(1− γ) > x
21
1 =
c(1− β1)
1− γ ≥ bˆ
2
2.
6.3 Wini with SSPs
As for the solution of wini under SSPs, we need to add to the basic linear
program (16-19) the the SSPs constraints (6-8).
[winiSSP] The optimal wini mechanism under SSPs is (20), with β1 ≤ β2.
Proof. We begin by showing that, as in the case of IAPs, the optimal wini
contract in R1 is (22). This is because, also in this case, f
1
1 (b1) is not binding,
since τ 11 = −1−β1β1 > 1 and x11 = c1−γ < cγ .
On the other hand, the optimal wini contract in R2 is (20), independently
of the value of β1. This is because, given -1¡ γi < 0, both τ
2
1 and τ
2
2 are
positive. Since τ 21 = −1−β1β1 ; |τ 21 | > 1 (i.e., as before, f 21 (b1) and f 22 (b1)
intersect in the first quadrant. Also notice that, given βi < 0, i = 1, 2,
y21 =
c(−1+β1)
(1−γ)β1 < 0. Two are the relevant cases:
1. If β1 > β2, then f
2
1 (b1) and f
2
2 (b1) intersect outside R2, and the optimal
solution would be b1 = b2 =
c(1−βˇ)
(1−γ) .
2. If β1 < β2, then the solution is (20) which averall cost is never greater
than 2c1−βˇ)
(1−γ) .
We complete the proof by noticing, by analogy with the Proof of Propo-
sition 6.2, that the optimal solution lies in R2, rather than in R1.
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6.4 Wini with ESPs
In the case of wini with ESPs, we need to add to the basic linear program
(16-19) the the ESPs constraints (9-11).
[winiESP] The optimal wini mechanism under ESPs is (20), with β1 ≤ β2.
Proof. We begin by showing that here the optimal wini contract in R1 is
(22) if |α2| < γ and bˆ1 =
{
c
γ
, 0
}
if β2 ≥ γ. This is because, like in the previous
cases, f 11 (b1) is never binding, since x
1
1 =
c
1−γ <
c
γ
and τ 11 = −1−β1β1 < 0. On
the other hand, given that x12 = − c(1+α2)α2(1−γ) and 0 ≤ τ 12 ≤ 12 , f 12 (b1) is binding
if and only if |α2| < γ (i.e. if x12 > cγ ).
As for R2, we begin to notice that τ
2
1 = −1−β1β1 ≥ −1 (since |β1| < 12)
and that 0≤ τ 22 = α2+γβ21+α2a`γ(1−β2) < 1. This implies, like before, that f 21 (b1) and
f 22 (b1) intersect in the first quadrant. The rest of the proof is identical of
that of Proposition 6.3.
7 Solution of the mechanism design problem
under the sini program
In the case of sini, the search of the optimal mechanism corresponds to the
wini linear program (16-19) with an additional constraint (implementation
with a unique equilibrium):
u1(1, 0) ≥ u1(0, 0). (27)
The constraint (27) makes, on behalf of player 1, the choice of putting
effort a weakly dominant strategy.
7.1 Sini under EPs
The solution of sini under EPs is as follows (see Winter [33]):
b∗1 =
c
γ
,
b∗2 =
c
1−γ .
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7.2 Sini under IAPs
The optimal sini mechanism under IAPs is{
b∗1 =
c((1+α1)(1+α2)−γ(1−β2))
γ(1+α1+α2−γ(1+α1−β2)) ,
b∗2 =
c(1+α1)(γ+α2)
γ(1+α1+α2−γ(1+α1−β2)) .
(28)
To prove Proposition 7.2, we follow the same strategy as before.
bˆ1 =
(
c(1+α2)
(1−γ)γ ,
c(γ+α2)
(1−γ)γ
)
.
Proof. In R1, the constraints for agent 1 and 2 correspond to:
•
b1 ≥ f 11 (b1) ≡
c(1− β1)
(1− γ)β1 −
1− β1
β1
b1, (29)
b1 ≥ f 13 (b1) ≡
c(1− β1)
γ(1− γ)β1 −
1− β1
β1
b1, (30)
b2 ≥ f 12 (b1) ≡
c
1− γ +
α2
1 + α2
b1, (31)
Let xkli solves f
k
1 (x) = g
l(x). We first notice that (29) is not binding.
This is becasue (29) defines a constraint which is parallel to (30), but
with a smaller intercept (y11 < y
1
3, since γ < 1). Also notice that, in this
case, (30) is not binding either. This is becuase, τ 13 < 0, τ
1
2 > 0 , and
x123 =
c(1−γβ1)
γ(1−γ) < x
12
2 =
c(1+α2)
γ(1−γ) .
This implies that, in R1, (b1 + b2) is minimized (like in slwini) where
f 12 (b1) and g
2(b1) intersect, i.e. when bˆ
1
1 =
c(1+α2)
(1−γ)γ and bˆ
1
2 =
c(γ+α2)
(1−γ)γ .
The optimal sini contract in R2 is (28).
Proof. R2, the relevant constraints are as follows:
b1 ≥ f 21 (b1) ≡
c(1− β1)
(1− γ)β1 −
1− β1
β1
b1 (32)
b1 ≥ f 23 (b1) ≡ −
c(1 + α1)
γα1
+
1 + α1
α1
b1 (33)
b2 ≥ f 22 (b1) ≡
c(1− β2)
1 + α2 − γ(1− β2) −
α2 + γβ2
1 + α2 − γ(1− β2)b1. (34)
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Notice that, by analogy with R1, condition (32) is not binding since τ
2
1 < 0
, τ 23 > 0 and x
1
1 =
c
1−γ < x
3
3 =
c
γ
. Also notice that 0 < x212 =
c(1−β2)
1−γ < x
21
3 =
c(1+α1)
γ
and x222 =
c(1+α2)
α(1−γ) > x
22
3 =
c
γ
. This, in turn, implies that, f 23 (b1) and
f 22 (b1) always intersect in the interior of R2, which implies the solution.
11
We are in the position to prove Proposition 7.2.
Proof. To close the proposition, it is sufficient to show that bˆ1i ≥ bˆ2i , i = 1, 2.
To see this, notice that x122 = x
22
2 =
c(1+α2)
γ(1−γ) (i.e. f
2
2 (b1) and f
2
2 (b1) cross
exactly at the intersection with g2(b1)). Since τ
2
2 =
α2+γβ2
1+α2−γ(1−β2) > 0 and bˆ
2
is interior to R2, the result follows.
7.3 Sini under SSPs
The optimal sini mechanism under SSPs is (28).
Proof. By analogy with the IAP case, in R1, (29) is not binding. Also notice
that τ 13 = −1−β1β1 > τ 12 = α21+a2 > 0. Two are the relevant cases:
1. if α2 ≥ −γβ1,(i.e. if x123 = c(1−γβ1)γ(1−γ) ≤ x122 = c(1+α2)γ(1−γ) ), then (33) is not
binding, and the optimal solution is the intersection between f 12 (b1)
and g3(b1), that is, bˆ
1 =
(
c(1+α2)
γ(1−γ) ,
c(γ+α2)
γ(1−γ)
)
;
2. if α2 < −γβ1, then the optimal solution is the intersection between
f 12 (b1) and f
1
3 (b1), that is, .
bˆ1 =
(
c(1 + α2)(1− β1(1 + γ))
γ(1− γ)(1 + α2 − β1) ,
c(α2 + γ(1 + α2))(1− β1)
γ(1− γ)(1 + α2 − β1)
)
.
As for R2, the optimal sini contract is, again, (28 ). This is becuase, by
analogy with the IAP case, conditions (32) and g2(b1) are not binding. Also
notice that x222 =
c(1+γ2)
γ(1−γ) > 0 and 0 ≤ τ 22 = α2+γβ21+α2−γ(1−β2) < 1. This, in turn,
implies that, in R2, (b1 + b2) is minimized where f
2
3 (b1) and f
2
2 (b1) intersect,
which implies the solution.
11As it turns out, unlike the wini case, the search for the appropriate conditions on
preferences to identify player 1 has no (algebraically manageable) closed-form solution,
but it has to be evalutaed numerically (as we did in the calibration of our experimental
conditions).
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7.4 Sini under ESPs
The optimal sini mechanism under ESPs is (28).
Proof. By analogy with the previous cases, in R1, (29) is not binding.
Also notice that, in this case, (32) is not binding either, since τ 12 < 0 and
x122 =
c(1+a2)
γ(1−γ) <
c
γ
. Since, by (9-11), γ1 ≤ 12 , the unique solution in this case
is bˆ1 =
(
c
γ(1−γ) , 0
)
.
As for R2, we first notice that, given that |β1| ≤ 12 , τ 23 > 1. Since, by
(9),|α2| < γ (i.e. x22 > cγ , then the optimal solution is the intersection
between f 12 (b1) and g3(b1), that is, (28).
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SSP
a
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EP Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Agents 11 8 10 6 13
% 22.92 16.67 20.83 12.50 27.08 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Obs.
Principals 3 6 6 1 8 Agents 0,35 0,25 0,16 0,24 48
% 12.50 25.00 25.00 4.17 33.33 Principals 0,39 0,22 0,07 0,32 24
Total 14 14 16 7 21 Total 0,36 0,24 0,13 0,26 72
% 19.44 19.44 22.22 9.72 29.17
Fig. 5
a) b)
BR=0 BR=1 BR=0 BR=1 NO BR BR
δ=0 112 44 229 26 Player 1 92 484
% 71.8 28.2 89.8 10.2 % 15.9 84.1
δ=1 53 324 112 209 Player 2 58 518
% 12.6 87.4 34.9 65.1 % 10.1 89.9
Total 165 369 341 235 Total 150 1002
% 28.6 71.4 59.2 40.8 % 13 87
a) 
Coeff. Std. Err. p-value Coeff. Std. Err. p-value Coeff. Std. Err. p-value Coeff. Std. Err. p-value
beta 0,242 0,067 0,000 0,291 0,072 0,000 -0,084 0,022 0,000 -0,040 0,019 0,036
gamma 0,183 0,084 0,030 0,228 0,090 0,011 -0,051 0,027 0,060 -0,018 0,023 0,430
V -0,002 0,003 0,535 -0,002 0,003 0,475 0,000 0,001 0,839 0,000 0,001 0,882
Regression Iia
b)
Regression I Regression Ia Regression II
Fig. 7
Fig. 8
Player 1 Player 2
EP Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 EP Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Player 1 0,98 0,99 0,97 0,88 1,00 0,88 0,89 0,91 0,88 0,87
Player 2 0,76 0,67 0,43 0,78 0,78 0,71 0,73 0,79 0,83 0,79
Principals N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0,79 0,76 0,78 0,38 0,75
EP Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 MEAN EP Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 MEAN
WINI 0,47 0,50 0,36 0,57 0,65 0,51 0,46 0,39 0,33 0,43 0,65 0,45
SINI 0,94 0,94 0,92 0,73 0,95 0,89 0,92 0,94 0,89 0,83 0,92 0,90
MEAN 0,70 0,72 0,64 0,65 0,80 0,70 0,69 0,67 0,61 0,63 0,78 0,68
DIFF -0,47 -0,44 -0,56 -0,16 -0,30 -0,38 -0,46 -0,55 -0,57 -0,40 -0,27 -0,45
WINI 0,58 0,43 0,40 0,23 0,42 0,41 0,49 0,51 0,23 0,32 0,48 0,40
SINI 0,68 0,64 0,46 0,56 0,68 0,60 0,66 0,61 0,51 0,71 0,72 0,64
MEAN 0,63 0,54 0,43 0,39 0,55 0,51 0,57 0,56 0,37 0,51 0,60 0,52
DIFF -0,10 -0,21 -0,06 -0,32 -0,26 -0,19 -0,17 -0,10 -0,28 -0,39 -0,24 -0,24
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Last 12 80 19 31 41 19 5 90 147 59 15 10 24 17 2 60 101
% 46.78 11.11 18.13 23.98 7.28 1.92 34.48 56.32 54.63 13.89 9.26 22.22 9.44 1.11 33.33 56.11
Total 124 43 68 104 29 13 173 310 94 30 32 66 23 9 106 216
% 36.58 12.68 20.06 30.68 5.52 2.48 32.95 59.05 42.34 13.51 14.41 29.73 6.50 2.54 29.94 61.02
TR3 - SINITR2 - WINI TR2 - SINI TR3 - WINI
Fig. 11
  
 
 
 
Appendix B 
Experimental Instructions 
 
WELCOME TO THE EXPERIMENT!  
 
 
• This is an experiment to study how people make decisions. We are only interested in what 
people do on average. 
• Please, do not think we expect a particular behavior from you. On the other hand, keep in 
mind that your behavior will affect the amount of money you can win. 
• In what follows you will find the instructions explaining how this experiment runs and how 
to use the computer during the experiment.  
• Please do not bother the other participants during the experiment. If you need help, raise 
your hand and wait in silence. We will help you as soon as possible. 
 
THE EXPERIMENT 
 
• In this experiment, you will play for 72 subsequent rounds. These 72 rounds are divided in 
3 PHASES, and every PHASE has 24 rounds. 
 
PHASE 1 
 
• In each of the 24 rounds of PHASE 1, you will play with ANOTHER PLAYER in this 
room.  
• The identity of this person will change one round after the other. You will never know if 
you interacted with the OTHER PLAYER in the past, nor the OTHER PLAYER will ever 
know if he has interacted with you. This means your choices will always remain 
anonymous.  
• In each round of PHASE 1, first the computer will randomly choose 4 different 
OPTIONS, that is, four monetary payoff pairs, one for you and one for the OTHER 
PLAYER. Every OPTION will always appear on the left of the screen.  
• Then, you and the OTHER PLAYER have to choose, simultaneously, your favorite 
OPTION.  
• Once you and the OTHER PLAYER have made your decision, the computer will 
randomly determine who (either you or the OTHER PLAYER) will decide the OPTION 
for the pair.  
• We will call this player the CHOOSER of the game.  
• The identity of the CHOOSER will be randomly determined in each round.  
• On average half of the times you will be the CHOOSER and half of the time the 
OTHER PLAYER will be the CHOOSER. 
• Thus, in each round, the monetary payoffs that both players receive will be determined by 
the choice of the CHOOSER. 
 
PHASE 2 
 
• In the following 24 rounds of PHASE 2, you will participate to a game similar to the 
previous one, with some modifications. 
• In PHASE 2, each pair will face a payoffs matrix that appears on the left of the screen. 
 
 
   
BID NO YES 
NO 40,40 40+b1/4, 30+b2/4 
YES 30+b1/4, 40+b2/4 30+b1, 30+b2 
 
 
What does this matrix mean? 
 
• In each round, you and the OTHER PLAYER, will receive an initial endowment of 40 
pesetas. 
• In each round, you and the OTHER PLAYER have to choose, simultaneously, whether to 
BID or NOT TO BID . 
• BIDting costs 10 pesetas, not BIDting does not cost anything. 
• You choose the ROW, the OTHER PLAYER chooses the COLUMN.  
• Every cell of the matrix (which depends on the monetary payoffs b1 and b2 and your 
decisions on whether or not TO BID) contains two numbers. 
• The first number (on the left) is what you win in this round. The second (on the 
• right) is what the OTHER PLAYER wins in this round. There are four possibilities: 
 
1. If both players BID, both sum to the initial endowment their ENTIRE 
MONETARY PAYOFF b1 or b2 (to which it will be subtracted the cost of 
BIDting of 10 pesetas). 
2. If you BID, and the OTHER PLAYER does not, both sum to both sum to their 
endowment ONE FOURTH of the monetary payoff b1 or b2 (and the cost of 
BIDting will be subtracted to you only);  
3. If the OTHER PLAYER BIDs, and you don’t, both sum to their endowment 
ONE FOURTH of their monetary payoff b1 or b2 (and the cost of BIDting will 
be subtracted to the OTHER PLAYER only); 
4. If nobody BIDS, you and the OTHER PLAYER will only gain the endowment of 
40 pesetas.
 
  
PHASE 2 is compound of 2 STAGES:  
 
• In STAGE 1, you and the OTHER PLAYER have to choose your favorite OPTION, that 
is, the game that you would like to play in STAGE 2.  
• After that you and the OTHER PLAYER have made your decision, the computer will 
randomly determine who (either you or the OTHER PLAYER) will be the CHOOSER of 
the game.  
• Like in PHASE 1, the identity of the CHOOSER, will be randomly determined in each 
round. 
• On average, half of times you will be the CHOOSER and half of times the OTHER 
PLAYER will be the CHOOSER.  
• Once the CHOOSER has determined the option that will be played in this round, you and 
the other player have to choose whether TO BID or NOT TO BID and the monetary 
consequences of your decisions are exactly those we just explained. 
 
SUMMING UP 
 
• In each of the 24 rounds of PHASE 2, you will play with ANOTHER PLAYER of this 
room.  
• In STAGE 1, you and the other player, like in STAGE 1, have to choose  simultaneously 
your favorite OPTION. 
•  After that you and the OTHER PLAYER have made your decisions, the CHOOSER will 
determine the game that you will play in STAGE 2. 
• In STAGE 2 you and the OTHER PLAYER have to simultaneously DECIDE whether to 
BID or NOT TO BID. The payoffs of each round depend on your initial endowment of 
40 pesetas, on both your choices (TO BID or NOT TO BID), on the OPTION chosen by 
the CHOOSER and on the cost of bidding of 10 pesetas.  
• The PAYOFF MATRIX (that it will always appear on the left of your screen) sums up, in a 
compact form, the monetary consequences of your choices. 
 
PHASE 3 
 
• In the last 24 rounds of PHASE 3, you will play in a game similar to the PHASE 2 but with 
some differences.  
• Within the 24 persons in this room, the computer will randomly choose two groups of 12. 
• In each group of 12 people, the computer will randomly determine, 8 PLAYERS and 4 
REFEREES.  
• The identity of PLAYERS and REFEREES is randomly determined at the beginning of 
PHASE 2 and it will remain the same theoughout. 
 
PHASE 3 has 3 STAGES.  
 
• Like in the previous PHASES, in STAGE 1 the computer randomly selects 4 OPTIONS, 
(that is, 4 pairs of monetary payoffs (b1,b2) for the players.  
• In addition, in STAGE 1, each REFEREE randomly picks an OPTION within the 4 
available for that round (that could be the same or different among them).  
• Thus, the 4 OPTIONS selected by the four REFEREES will be proposed to the 8 
PLAYERS of their group.  
• In STAGE 2, the 8 players will be randomly paired. Like before, couple will change at 
every round. 
• Then, just like in STAGE 2, each player has to select one among the 4 OPTIONS 
proposed by the 4 REFEREES.  
• Just like in PHASE 2, the (randomly selected) CHOOSER will deterine the game to be 
played by the pair.  
• Just like in PHASE 2, in the game, both PLAYERS have to choose simultaneously, 
whether TO BID or NOT TO BID. 
• The monetary consequences for the players of their decision are exactly the same as in 
STAGE 2. 
 
REFEREES’ PAYOFF 
 
The REFEREES’ payoffs depend on  
 
1. the OPTION they offer,  
2. how many REFEREES in their group offer the same OPTION 
3. how many CHOOSERS choose the same OPTION 
4. Players’ actions in the game. 
 
We shall make this clearer with some examples. 
 
CASE 1 
 
• First, suppose that the REFEREE offered an OPTION with payoffs (b1, b2) and that only 
one CHOOSER has chosen this option.  
• The payoff of each REFEREE depends on the positive VALUE randomly generated by 
the computer and that each REFEREE (and only her) knows, and, in addition, on the sum 
of the payoffs b1+b2 in the following way: 
•  
• if both players BID, the REFEREE win the difference between his VALUE and the sum 
of the payoffs; that is,  V-(b1+b2); 
•  if one player BETS and the other does not, the REFEREE win ONE FOURTH of the 
difference between his VALUE and the sum of the payoffs; that is, 
! 
V " (b1+ b2)
4
 
• if nobody bets, the REFEREE does not win anything. 
 
 
In this case, the PAYOFF MATRIX of the REFEREE, will be as follows: 
 
 
BID NO YES 
NO 0 (V-(b1+b2))/4 
YES (V-(b1+b2))/4 V-(b1+b2) 
 
 
CASE 2 
 
• Suppose now that more than one CHOOSER chose the option that the REFEREE 
 offered. Moreover, suppose moreover that this REFEREE is the only one that picked this 
OPTION. 
• In this case the REFEREE gets the sum of the payoffs obtained with each couple that 
chose her OPTION.  
• The payoff with each couple will be determined as in CASE 1, taking into account if they 
bid, if only one bids or nobody bids. 
 
 
CASE 3 
 
• Suppose now that one or more CHOOSERS chose an option that the REFEREE 
 offered. Moreover, suppose that more than one REFEREE picked the same OPTION. In 
this case, every single REFEREE that chose the same OPTION gets a payoff with the 
same structure as in CASE 2, but now, sharing this payoff with the REFEREES that 
picked the same option. 
 
CASE 4 
 
• Suppose now that no couple chose the option that the REFEREE offered. In this case, her 
payoff for this round will be 0. 
